Research on the Income Distribution Mechanism of the New Energy Charging Network Alliance
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/xtzsmk10Keywords:
Game theory, charging network, income distribution.Abstract
The alliance of the new energy charging network is a cooperative organization consisting of car manufacturers, charging facility manufacturers, and operators. Reasonable income distribution is the key to forming and sustaining the alliance. According to the cooperation period, this article divides the alliance types into short-term and long-term cooperation. In the context of short-term cooperation, this article employs the Nash negotiation model to establish a fixed-ratio distribution mechanism. For long-term alliances, this article innovatively proposes a dynamic adjustment mechanism, introduces investment, risk sharing, and cooperative contribution to modify the Shapley value for preliminary income distribution, and then conducts Nash negotiation adjustment based on the satisfaction levels of all members in the alliance. The data results show that the fixed ratio model increases the short-term cooperation benefits by 19-24%, while the dynamic adjustment mechanism increases the benefits of long-term alliance members by 21-22%. By contrast, the dynamic adjustment mechanism narrows the gap in the income distribution ratio and effectively balances the pattern of benefit distribution.
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