Analysis of Repeated Games in International Climate Negotiations- With China as an Example

Abstract

Through a systematic analysis of the current situation of international climate governance, this paper finds that the current international climate negotiations are characterized by an obvious “national interest priority”, in which countries seek to maximize their interests through the mechanism of repeated games while adhering to their respective positions and principles. The research results show that this repeated game mechanism provides an important path for the formulation of a more equitable and effective global climate policy. To realize this goal, the following key measures are needed: first, implement a scientific and reasonable phased emission reduction plan, and break down the long-term climate goals into operable milestones; second, adhere to the basic principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, and set up a fair and reasonable institutional arrangement; third, build a multilevel and multi-channel international communication platform, and effectively enhance mutual trust among countries; finally, strengthen environmental education, improve information disclosure, and so on, to maximize the benefits of global climate policies through the repeated game mechanism. Finally, the public's awareness of environmental protection should be enhanced through strengthening environmental education and improving information disclosure. These mechanisms design not only respect the reasonable interests of countries, but also effectively promote global climate governance from confrontation to mutually beneficial cooperation, and ultimately realize a new pattern of win-win cooperation. The findings of this paper provide new theoretical perspectives and practical paths to break the current deadlock in international climate negotiations.