Push or Resistance-A Game Analysis of Consumer Behavioral Decisions under Policy Stimulus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/cercvf28Keywords:
Consumption incentives, consumer behavioral decisions, evolutionary games, replication of dynamic equations.Abstract
With the deep popularization of Internet technology and the accelerated transformation of the economic structure, online consumption has broken through the time and space constraints of traditional business models and become the core engine driving the growth of domestic demand. In order to release the consumption potential, the government has successively launched composite policy tools such as digital consumption vouchers, tax credits, and platform subsidies. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model of consumer behavioral choices under the consumption stimulus policy, analyzes the dynamic impact of the policy on consumption behavior through replicating dynamic equations and numerical simulation, and explores the game relationship between policy "thrust" and consumption "resistance". From the analysis of the game model, it can be seen that the effectiveness of the policy not only depends on the benefit design of the policy itself, but also is closely related to the consumer's expectations, consumption habits and market environment. In this regard, corresponding policy optimization suggestions are put forward to ultimately achieve a virtuous cycle of short-term stimulation and long-term cultivation of consumption capacity.
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