Setting Market Rules to Combat Fake Positive Reviews Based on Game Theory: Achieving a Win-win Situation for Consumers, Government and Merchants
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/57sss916Keywords:
Signal Game, False Positive Reviews, Trust Crisis, Market Rules.Abstract
In the era of online shopping, the phenomenon of false positive reviews for online products is emerging in an endless stream, seriously disrupting the market order. In order to protect the rights and interests of consumers, traditional governance concepts mostly deal with chaos from the perspectives of state fines and supervision and improving consumers' ability to discern. This study innovatively breaks through the binary opposition paradigm of "government regulation-market entities". While improving traditional governance measures, it proposes an anti-false positive review scheme that maximizes reliance on market autonomy rather than government regulation and allows merchants to make profits. This paper first analyzes the pros and cons of traditional governance measures. Then, by analyzing problem examples and references, a four-stage scheme is used to integrate the governance issues of various entities. Finally, the cost differentiation method of the signal game model is designed to study the effectiveness and feasibility of the new scheme. Therefore, taking into account the interests of all parties and seeking a win-win solution can provide a better solution for the governance of false positive reviews.
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