Douyin Platform’s Short-Video Content Homogenization: An Analysis of Innovation Dilemmas Based on Coordination Games

Abstract

Short-video platforms like Douyin (TikTok) optimize engagement algorithms, inadvertently incentivizing content homogenization. Using coordination game theory, this study analyzes how algorithmic incentives drive content homogenization, analyzing strategic interactions among content producers, users, and platform operators. Using coordination game theory-the research reveals that Douyin’s engagement-optimized algorithms create a Nash equilibrium where 90% of producers rationally choose imitation over originality, driven by fears of algorithmic invisibility and market competition. Case evidence demonstrates that 78% of top beauty tutorials follow standardized templates, while user surveys show 63% frustration with repetition, but 72% continued trend participation for social relevance. While homogenization delivers short-term benefits in brand scalability (e.g., Perfect Diary’s 300% sales surge via templated content) and community cohesion, it exacts long-term costs: 22% user attrition in homogeneous categories. The study proposes multi-faceted solutions: algorithmic diversification (integrating novelty scores and diversity quotas), incentive realignment (tiered funding for original content), AI-driven IP enforcement (blockchain timestamping and plagiarism detection), and user-centric curation (diversity dashboards). These strategies aim to resolve strategic dissonance between individual rationality and collective welfare, balancing engagement with creative sustainability. By situating homogenization as a coordination failure in digital ecosystems, the research enriches media economics literature with game-theoretic insights, offering actionable frameworks for platform governance. Findings highlight the need for regulatory intervention and industry collaboration to cultivate diverse, innovative content ecosystems.